The Iran war has brought the contradictions within BRICS into sharper focus. The grouping is expanding its influence and challenging the dominance of Western-led institutions, yet its members remain divided by conflicting strategic interests, regional rivalries and differing relationships with the US.
Those tensions were on full display at the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and leaders from several other member countries.
For India, bringing such a diverse group of leaders together was itself a diplomatic achievement. But turning that gathering into a unified political force proved far more difficult.
BRICS is increasingly seen by China, Russia and Iran as a platform to reduce Western influence and build a more multipolar global order.
India, however, has resisted turning the grouping into an anti-Western alliance. New Delhi wants BRICS to give emerging economies a greater voice without forcing members to choose between the West and the emerging China-Russia axis.
That balancing act has become particularly important amid the Iran war and growing tensions in global trade.
India's approach is essentially one of strategic autonomy: deepen cooperation among BRICS members while retaining strong economic and diplomatic relationships with the US and Europe.
The New Delhi Declaration showed both the potential and limitations of BRICS.
Earlier ministerial meetings had failed to produce joint statements because of disagreements among members. This time, the leaders managed to reach consensus, but largely by avoiding issues on which their positions sharply diverge.
On the Middle East conflict, the declaration called for maximum restraint and condemned attacks on civilian infrastructure and peaceful nuclear facilities without assigning responsibility.
It backed a two-state solution for the Israel-Palestine conflict and opposed forced displacement and measures that could prolong occupation.
Notably, there was no reference to Russia's war in Ukraine, unlike several earlier BRICS declarations.
The language on trade was similarly cautious. The grouping expressed concern over rising tariffs and criticised unilateral sanctions, but did not directly name the US.
That restraint is significant at a time when US President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticised BRICS initiatives that he sees as challenging American economic influence.
One of the most striking developments on the sidelines of the summit was a meeting between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
The encounter was particularly significant because Iran and the UAE have found themselves on opposite sides of the wider Middle East conflict.
For Tehran, the BRICS summit offered an opportunity to demonstrate that Iran still has diplomatic and economic partners despite US sanctions, military pressure and restrictions on its international trade.
Pezeshkian used the occasion to push for stronger economic relations with BRICS members including India, Malaysia and Ethiopia.
The wider conflict has also underlined the economic importance of such relationships. Energy security, shipping routes, sanctions, currency volatility and supply chains are now increasingly intertwined with geopolitics.
The summit also provided an important backdrop for India-China relations.
Xi's visit to New Delhi was his first in seven years. Relations between the two Asian giants deteriorated sharply after the 2020 border clashes, while their trade relationship remains heavily tilted in China's favour.
The interaction between Modi and Xi was cordial, although noticeably restrained. More importantly, the two sides discussed strengthening business ties and transport connectivity and addressing barriers to trade.
That could be significant for Indian businesses if the recent easing of tensions develops into more predictable economic relations. But deep strategic mistrust remains, and any substantial improvement will require progress beyond diplomatic gestures.
The Delhi summit demonstrated that BRICS can provide something increasingly valuable in a fragmented world: a forum where countries with serious differences can still meet, negotiate and pursue their own interests.
But that is also its biggest limitation. The grouping includes countries that have territorial disputes, competing regional ambitions and sharply different relationships with the US and the West. The Iran war has exposed those contradictions rather than resolving them.
BRICS may therefore be more useful as a platform for strategic autonomy and economic cooperation than as a cohesive geopolitical bloc.
The bigger question is whether its members can move beyond declarations and build practical alternatives in areas such as trade, payments, finance, energy and supply chains.
The Delhi summit showed that the appetite for a new global order is growing. It also showed how difficult it will be for BRICS members to agree on what that order should look like.
