India’s missile strikes within Pakistani territory, further inflaming tensions between the nuclear-armed neighbours, have drawn swift international attention—particularly from China and the United States.
US President Donald Trump told reporters at the White House that “if I can do anything to help, I will be there”, noting he “gets along very well” with both sides.
The growing geopolitical stakes were underscored as China tacitly backed its long-standing ally Pakistan, which confirmed it had deployed Chinese-made fighter jets against India’s increasingly Western-supplied arsenal.
While direct involvement by major powers appears unlikely, analysts highlighted the deepening security alignments: the US and India on one side, and China and Pakistan on the other. These alliances are expected to translate into various forms of political, military, and intelligence support.
Indian officials said New Delhi maintained “robust” and “strong” communication channels with Washington before and after the missile strikes, with the US expressing “overwhelming” support for India’s counter-terrorism actions.
India provided detailed briefings to US National Security Adviser and Secretary of State Marco Rubio within hours of the strikes, emphasising the futility of external mediation or international investigation, an analysis by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post analysis noted.
The strikes were carried out in response to the April 22 killing of 26 people in Pahalgam. New Delhi claims it has clear intelligence linking the attack to Pakistan-backed militant groups. Islamabad has denied involvement and called for a transparent, international investigation—an appeal that has been echoed by Beijing.
Michael Kugelman, a Washington-based South Asia analyst, noted that the “very close defence partnership that China has with Pakistan, and that the US has with India, are key factors and should not be overlooked in this crisis.”
He said many in Washington view Pakistan as “essentially in China’s camp”, despite Islamabad’s efforts to balance its relations with both global powers.
India and the US have significantly expanded defence cooperation in recent years, partly as a counterweight to China’s growing influence. India is a key member of the Quad, a strategic grouping that includes the US, Australia, and Japan, aimed at promoting a free and inclusive Indo-Pacific.
During a February meeting at the White House, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Trump agreed to broaden defence sales and explore co-production efforts to enhance interoperability and defence industrial ties.
While Russia still supplies over 30 percent of India’s military equipment, New Delhi is increasingly sourcing arms from countries like France, the US, and Israel. According to US government data, Washington has sold nearly $20 billion in advanced defence systems to India over the past two decades.
Kugelman described intelligence sharing as the “sweet spot” of the US–India defence relationship, citing instances such as a 2022 case where US intelligence reportedly helped India avert a potential Chinese border incursion.
He noted that while India has traditionally been cautious about third-party involvement, it is more comfortable with intelligence cooperation, seeing it as a “safe” form of collaboration.
However, if full-scale conflict breaks out between India and Pakistan, India would likely deprioritise its Indo-Pacific partnerships and the Quad, Kugelman added.
In Washington, speculation about the Quad becoming directly involved has been met with scepticism. A former US State Department official involved in Quad policy said he doubted the crisis would implicate the alliance directly. “The biggest concern,” he said, “is how such tensions could be de-escalated if they spiral.”
He added, “China looms large in that equation, given their so-called all-weather friendship with Pakistan and increasingly tense relations with New Delhi.”
Still, he argued that the crisis was unlikely to affect the Quad directly: “Its strength lies in being informal and not a traditional security alliance.”
Andrew Small of the German Marshall Fund noted that the situation gave Beijing an opportunity to show that “they look after their friends.” In a social media post, he said that while China was likely to provide diplomatic and intelligence support to Pakistan, bilateral ties had weakened over the past decade due to Islamabad’s failure to protect Chinese nationals and broader dissatisfaction in Beijing with Pakistan’s internal security, economy, and politics.
A recent bomb blast in Karachi that killed two Chinese nationals has heightened those concerns.
Small also noted that Beijing expects the US to support India—and would do the same for Pakistan. While not actively seeking escalation, China may see value in observing the performance of its weaponry against India’s Western-sourced systems.
Sarang Shidore of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft said China had become an “indirect party” to India–Pakistan tensions due to its “deep security nexus” with Islamabad.
However, Kugelman stressed that China has substantial economic stakes in Pakistan—including major infrastructure investments—and has recently made efforts to ease tensions with India.
A full-blown war would put China’s assets in Pakistan at risk and undermine Beijing’s attempts to pursue “limited” economic engagement with New Delhi, he said.
